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Whereas previous Sidney Mintz lectures have celebrated Mintz’s
work on inequality, racism, and ethnicity, I have chosen to speak
to the broadest scope of his research and teaching in anthropol-
ogy. A comparative perspective on human knowledge allows us
to unravel a number of aspects of the cultural worlds which peo-
ple construct. I argue that knowledge always has three faces: a
substantive corpus of assertions, a range of media of representa-
tion, and a social organization. Using ethnographic materials
from New Guinea and Bali and also from our own universities, I
try to show how in different traditions of knowledge these faces
will interrelate in particular ways and generate tradition-specific
criteria of validity for knowledge about the world. Thus the tra-
jectory of a tradition of knowledge will be to a large extent en-
dogenously determined. This implies not a diffuse relativism of
“anything goes” but a relativism in which we can demonstrate
how already established thoughts, representations, and social re-
lations to a considerable extent configure and filter our individ-
ual human experience of the world around us and thereby gener-
ate culturally diverse worldviews.
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sity on November 2, 2000.
I wish to focus on the problem of knowledge—what a
person employs to interpret and act on the world. Under
this caption I wish to include feelings (attitudes) as well
as information, embodied skills as well as verbal tax-
onomies and concepts: all the ways of understanding that
we use to make up our experienced, grasped reality. We
all live lives full of raw and unexpected events,2 and we
can grasp them only if we can interpret them—cast them
in terms of our knowledge or, best, anticipate them by
means of our knowledge so that we can focus on them
and meet them to some degree prepared and with ap-
propriate measures. Thus a person’s stock of knowledge
structures that person’s understood world and purposive
ways of coping in it.
As we know, this stock of knowledge varies greatly
between persons. It shows staggering ethnographic di-
versity among local human populations; it varies socially
among adults within such populations; and of course it
varies developmentally, from the limited emotional reg-
istry and motor and voice control of infants to the com-
plexity of insights, information, and repertoires of adults.
My claim is that we can greatly advance our anthropo-
logical agenda by developing a comparative ethnographic
analysis on how bodies of knowledge are produced in
persons and populations in the context of the social re-
lations that they sustain.
In a brief exchange I was once privileged to have with
Clifford Geertz on the topic, he commented that my
view of knowledge and its role in human life did not
seem to distinguish it much from what anthropologists
have been calling “culture.” Indeed, it does focus on
many of the same data and seeks to analyse many of the
same phenomena. But in calling it knowledge rather than
culture I think that we ethnographers will analyse it
differently and find ourselves disaggregating our received
category of culture in distinctive ways that hinge on
what our ideas of “knowledge” evoke.
Knowledge provides people with materials for reflec-
tion and premises for action, whereas “culture” too read-
ily comes to embrace also those reflections and those
actions. Furthermore, actions become knowledge to oth-
ers only after the fact. Thus the concept of “knowledge”
situates its items in a particular and unequivocal way
relative to events, actions, and social relationships.
Knowledge is distributed in a population, while cul-
ture makes us think in terms of diffuse sharing. Our
scrutiny is directed to the distributions of knowl-
edge—its presence or absence in particular persons—and
the processes affecting these distributions can become
the objects of study.
Differences in knowledge provide much of the mo-
mentum for our social interaction, from gossip to the
division of labour. We must share some knowledge to be
able to communicate and usually must differ in some
knowledge to give focus to our interaction. An under-
standing of the balances of sharing and difference in
2. I am referring to what Weber (1949:81) called the “meaningless
infinity of the world process.”
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knowledge that predicate social cooperation should con-
stitute a vital part of any theory of human society.
The knowledge component of our being is conceptu-
ally separable from our relationships and group mem-
berships, the social dimensions of our lives. Yes, of
course social organization is based on knowledge—not
least, the knowledge of social statuses and their asso-
ciated rights and duties, assets, and expertise—but the
social aspect points specifically to the patterns of action
that unfold. Thus the social interaction that emerges on
that basis can be distinguished from the knowledge that
provides its base. This distinction will help us to escape
from the analytical impediment of a concept of “social
structure” which confounds the two and has hounded
much anthropological thought.
In the following, I will reflect briefly on the above as
a productive theoretical position and then exemplify and
elaborate it with some empirical sketches from New
Guinea, Bali, and contemporary universities.
What Knowledge Is
I do not think we should try to be too clever and start
practising as amateur philosophers or metaphysicians
rather than anthropologists. To the extent that we are
acquainted with contemporary currents on these topics,
this may be best used to liberate us from a compulsive
search for truth, rationality, and scientific method and
encourage our ethnographic discovery. But we cannot
afford to be too simple, either. In an effort to seek middle
ground, I turn to that towering but currently unfashion-
able philosopher, Bertrand Russell, especially to his 1948
popular overview Human Knowledge: Its Scope and
Limits.
Russell resolves for us the paradox of subjectivity and
shared knowledge. What a person knows, he points out,
is dependent on that person’s own individual experience:
“He knows what he has seen and heard, what he has
read and what he has been told, and also what, from these
data, he has been able to infer” (1948:9). An important
key lies in the last phrase, that knowledge can be based
on inference.
In virtue of certain events in my own life, I have a
number of beliefs about events that I do not experi-
ence—the thoughts and feelings of other people, the
physical objects that surround me, the historical and
geological past of the earth, and the remoter regions
of the universe that are studied in astronomy. For
my part, I accept these beliefs as valid, apart from
errors of detail. By this acceptance, I commit myself
to the view that there are valid processes of infer-
ence from events to other events—more particularly,
from events of which I am aware without inference
to events of which I have no such awareness.
By our acceptance of valid inference, we all extend the
reach and scope of our knowledge immensely, relying on
judgements based on whatever criteria of validity we em-
brace—above all, what others whom we trust tell us they
believe.
As a consequence, much of our knowledge we have
accumulated by learning from others—including, indeed,
the criteria for judging validity that we have learned to
use. Though it is experience-based, most knowledge thus
does not become private in any individual sense. This
makes a great deal of every person’s knowledge conven-
tional, constructed within the traditions of knowledge
of which each of us partakes. My personal skills and
embodied knowledge are likewise largely constituted on
the basis of activity into which I have been socialized,
some of them embodied through purposeful practice,
some of them preconceptual, arising from experience
based on how my physical body functions in the world
(Lakoff 1989). My analysis will seek to show precisely
this: how a knowledge that must have its wellsprings in
individual experience yet becomes to large extent con-
ventional in social circles and in turn what the processes
are whereby these conventional bodies of knowledge as-
sume their locally characteristic shapes.
Our academic prototype of “knowledge” probably re-
fers to the things that are contained in a textbook, an
encyclopedia, a dictionary. Such sources lay out knowl-
edge as if it were context-free—a mode that collapses
historical time in acquiring knowledge, elaborates tax-
onomies, and prizes coherence. It simulates a knowledge
without knowers. Some of our knowledge we do treat in
that way, but much of it we do not. It is important that
we not think single-mindedly with this narrow prototype
in mind in our comparative study of knowledge, since
such a mode, though it is no doubt salient for some pur-
poses in Western and perhaps in other literary traditions,
is certainly not the exclusive mode of knowledge for any
person in any tradition.
Current anthropological attention to the concept of
knowledge tends to focus on a particular syndrome of
contemporary issues. Is knowledge best understood as a
thing or a relationship? How far can (and should) ideas
be copyrighted and patented? Might a global code of in-
tellectual property rights provide a way to secure benefits
to indigenous peoples from their heritage?3 Anthropol-
ogists are caught in the tension between resisting the
runaway commoditization in our own world and a desire
to defend indigenous rights within it. These are impor-
tant issues but perhaps not the most felicitous way to
approach an anthropological study of knowledge. I sug-
gest that we put them aside here to concentrate on a
search for general insights, language, and concepts for an
anthropology of knowledge on which, among other
things, a more effective defence of indigenous rights
might draw.
Geertz (1983:4) has stated that “to an ethnographer,
sorting through the machinery of distant ideas, the
shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local, indi-
visible from their instruments and their encasements.”
3. For a review of this discussion, see Brown (1998). A useful dis-
cussion of indigenous knowledge in relation to development (Sil-
litoe 1998) is found in the same issue.
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If I read this correctly, my reaction would be yes, for a
generation of ethnographers steeped in a particular “cul-
tural” perspective, that has been true. What I am pro-
posing is that we break with this framing and work to
perform the mental, analytical operation of dividing the
shapes, instruments, and encasements from each other,
the better to analyse the internal processes of differently
constituted traditions of knowledge.
A Framework for Analysis
Where should anthropologists turn for a framework of
concepts and questions with which to explore the com-
parative ethnography of knowledge? It is important not
to be too clever and willing pupils of established Western
scholarship, lest we squander the opportunity for a fresh
perspective that can arise from the relatively unexplored
world of ethnography. As academics, we have been mar-
inated in Western philosophical discourse to the point
where we might too readily accept its current parochi-
alisms as universal premises. We want to be able to dis-
cover and be surprised by other lives and exercise the
relativism whereby all of the traditions, bodies of knowl-
edge, and ways of knowing practiced by people are rec-
ognized for our comparative and analytic purposes as
coeval and sustainable, each on its own premises. Our
first and major step must therefore be to try to lay out
how these traditions of knowledge are configured and
how they are variously reproduced and changed.
I see three faces or aspects of knowledge that can be
analytically distinguished. First, any tradition of knowl-
edge contains a corpus of substantive assertions and
ideas about aspects of the world. Secondly, it must be
instantiated and communicated in one or several media
as a series of partial representations in the form of words,
concrete symbols, pointing gestures, actions. And
thirdly, it will be distributed, communicated, employed,
and transmitted within a series of instituted social re-
lations. These three faces of knowledge are intercon-
nected.
Being interconnected, do they mutually determine
each other? That is my claim, as I wish to show in the
exemplifications that follow. But to develop the argu-
ment as simply as possible, we need to invert the way
we habitually think when we construct analyses. I am
not inviting you to take a highly generalized and abstract
unity (knowledge) and divide it into three parts (sub-
stantive corpus, communicative medium, and social or-
ganization) and then progressively break each of these
parts down further till we finally arrive at the level of
particular human actions and events. On the contrary,
my thesis is that these three faces of knowledge appear
together precisely in the particulars of action in every
event of the application of knowledge, in every trans-
action in knowledge, in every performance. Their mu-
tual determination takes place at those specific moments
when a particular item of substantive knowledge is cast
in a particular communicative medium and applied in
an action by an actor positioned in a particular social
organization: their systematic interdependence arises by
virtue of the constraints in realization that these three
aspects impose on each other in the context of every
particular application. Specific micro-circumstances will
thus determine how the mutual influences between the
faces of knowledge are affected, and to the extent that
we can identify repetitive, persistent effects of mutual
constraint and influence in these particular realizations
of knowledge, we have identified processes of mutual
determination between the three named aspects of
knowledge.
This perspective secures the space for agency in our
analysis: it makes us give the necessary close attention
to the knowers and to the acts of the knowers—the peo-
ple who hold, learn, produce, and apply knowledge in
their various activities and lives. Thus, as I shall try to
demonstrate, it is in the close analysis of action that we
shall see the mechanisms at work which effect the mu-
tual determination between the aspects of knowledge
that we have abstracted.
There, we can observe the interplay of circumstances
that generates the criteria of validity that govern knowl-
edge in any particular tradition. They arise through the
effects on action of the constraints embedded in the so-
cial organization—the distribution of knowledge, its con-
ventions of representation, the network of relations of
trust and identification, and instituted authority posi-
tions of power and disempowerment. But they are also
affected by constraints that arise from the properties of
the medium in which the knowledge is being cast, which
affect the ideas that can be conveyed through forms of
representation that are felicitous, limited, or impossible
for those ideas in that medium.
We may then be able to analyse the trajectory of a
changing corpus of knowledge by identifying the poten-
tials and constraints that these criteria of validity and
feasibility provide for the production and transmission
of knowledge in concrete traditions. This conjunction of
factors will have the effect of pointing native thinkers
and actors in particular directions of effort, creativity,
and representation.
Finally, we may be able to lay bare some of the deter-
minants of the forms of coherence or systematicity
achieved in various traditions of knowledge, depending
on how items in the corpus are constituted, how these
items are householded in the social organization, and the
degree of precision and force with which messages are
cast in the media and representations that are employed.
So far, I have tried to lay out a basically simple frame-
work of disaggregation, dissection, and analysis. To be
able to articulate the processes and connections more
clearly, my modelling has made the gross simplification
of ignoring the multiple ways in which exogenous factors
impinge on the processes I seek to analyse. To put them
into the model as well, it seems to me that one would
have to complicate it and expand it untenably. But in
each particular empirical case, such externalities must
be taken into account and may be highly salient. One
such factor is the ubiquitous one of the material circum-
stances, which determine the pragmatics under which
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local human life unfolds. The other would deal with re-
lations of power that arise outside the local social setting:
an environment of non-local others and their knowledge
systems, practices, and strengths will always impinge on
local worlds from the outside. To include them at this
point, however, would as far as I can see shatter the
framing of my present argument and militate against the
detailed exploration of systemic local processes that I
intend. The resulting exercise would then probably turn
into just one more generalized account of global pro-
cesses and their localized impacts. For present purposes,
I adopt the narrower—and yet dauntingly complex—
purview.
Transmission of Knowledge and Its
Trajectories of Change
Let me now specify more concretely how we may use
the framework I have outlined. First, I will summarize
some of the materials and analyses I have been devel-
oping on the Ok region of New Guinea (Barth 1975,
1987). This is a region of small, scattered local com-
munities. At the time and location of my first fieldwork
in 1968 among one of its groups, the Baktaman, they
were very recently contacted and thus just emerging
from a history of endemic warfare and limited com-
munication between adjoining settlements and none
with a more distant outside world. Subsistence was based
on the cultivation of taro as the main staple, supple-
mented by hunting, collecting, and modest pig raising.
The most abstract and systematically developed tradi-
tion of knowledge among them was cast in the form of
secret rituals that dealt with growth, vegetative fertility,
and support from ancestors—ancestors, incidentally,
who could be vindictive as well as bountiful, dangerous
even in the hands of their own cult masters. I shall try
to demonstrate the gross impacts of particular features
of social organization and the communicative medium
on the form of knowledge that was cultivated in this
tradition of knowledge and its trajectories of marginal
change.
The content of the Baktaman ritual/religious/cosmo-
logical tradition clearly falls within my concept of
knowledge: it provided people with a way to understand
major aspects of the world, ways to think and feel about
the world, and ways to act on it. One might call it a
mystery cult, recognizing that “mystery” is a philo-
sophically rather sophisticated construction that entails
not absence of knowledge but an experience of awe be-
fore phenomena and questions for which one believes
there can be no comprehensible final answers. Animal
species, ancestral bones, natural substances, fire, water,
colours, taboos, deception, pain, and fear, sacrifice,
spells, prayers, songs, and a small number of myths made
up the symbols and actions of cult and communication.
The sessions above all in which the tradition was cul-
tivated took place in small temples, attended by a hand-
ful of senior men, or, at the rare times of initiations, in
larger assemblies where seniors and novices engaged in
extensive rites some parts of which took place before an
audience of the uninitiated women and children of the
community.
In native consciousness, the validity of this knowledge
depended on its having been received from now deceased
ancestors under the constraints of secrecy. The secret
initiation of male novices therefore provided the vali-
dating organizational form in which the knowledge was
reproduced and transmitted. Among the Baktaman this
involved seven degrees of stepwise initiation through
which sets of novices advanced under the tutelage of a
cult master and of their next-senior set of initiates. The
process started with cohorts of boys of estimated age
5–14 years (this being an area without marked seasons,
the Baktaman were without concepts of calendrical
time), and it was not completed till the members of the
age-set were in their late thirties or early forties.
Wishing if possible to obtain a dynamic picture of this
tradition of knowledge, I tried to obtain indications of
historical changes in the initiation rituals among the
Baktaman and their neighbours. Given their embraced
premise that all valid knowledge was knowledge that had
been passed on by the ancestors, there were no oral his-
tories of changing traditions, but working through the
particulars of the recollections of a few older Baktaman
men I did eventually learn of nine minor items of ritual
that had indeed been changed or been subject to attempts
at change in their lifetimes. More strikingly, the riot of
variation revealed by comparing local and clearly cognate
communities in the larger region seemed to suggest the
prevalence of rapid historical flux over time. I return
below to what these materials on regional variation in-
dicate with respect to the trajectories of change in
knowledge.
First, according to the program of disaggregation and
analysis that I have announced above, I should provide
some more context for the particular forms of represen-
tation and the modes of transmission. The knowledge
contained in the tradition was cast, as we have seen, in
mainly non-verbal codes of images and acts. By means
of ritual manipulation and juxtaposition in the rituals,
analogies were constructed between phenomena, and
metaphors were created which were thus, as symbols,
brought into harmony with each other to enrich each
other’s connotations. Thus, for example, a series of anal-
ogies was demonstrated between different models of
growth—leaves on the trees, human hair on the head,
the fur of marsupials, the pandanus-leaf thatching of the
temple, the subcutaneous fat of pigs—linking all of them
as images of the effects of an invisible force, somewhat
like heat, that makes taro plants and subterranean taro
corms grow.
My claim is thus not, in the structuralist mode, that
these images are constituted as a series of oppositions
encoding the contrast between growth and decrease.
Such a representation of the knowledge involved trivi-
alizes it beyond repair. Rather, I understand them as cu-
mulative and harmonizing metaphors, connecting
known aspects of the world to shape an elusive, complex,
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and difficult-to-grasp appreciation of the pervasiveness
and mystery of growth.
To my mind, the most compelling secret and sacred
image of the mystery of taro growth—not revealed until
the sixth degree of initiation—was provided by the brush
turkey, the bones of which were uniquely placed along
with the ancestors’ bones in shrines within the temple.
Now, the brush turkey is a large wild fowl that buries
its eggs in large leaf-heap nests that it builds from forest
litter. There its eggs are incubated by the heat of com-
postation, until the chicks hatch at a stage of develop-
ment when they can break out of the ground and literally
fly away into the sky. Such paradoxical images are par-
ticularly favoured in Ok cults for the sense they create
of the hidden mystery of a covert power of transforma-
tion—here birds of the air that emerge from the very
ground in which the taro grows in sites characterized by
an elusive, sourceless heat. To similar effect, the first
small secret taught to little boys at first-degree initiation
was to rub themselves on the forehead with pig’s fat so
as to grow quickly—but also to rub dew on arms and
chest. While water was generally represented as a re-
moving agent that washes away other substances and
must not be allowed to spoil the effects of increase from
the pig’s fat, dew on the leaves of the forest in the early
morning was tagged as a secret growth force: a miracu-
lous inversion manifesting increase, where water itself
grows from nothing on the leaves of the forest in the
darkness of the night.
The communicative medium that embodies such vi-
sions and knowledge is thus one that depends for its force
on the combination of the heightened experience in-
duced by secrecy and danger, the vividness of imagery
of the selected natural symbols, and the complexity of
their harmonization through multiple revealed analogies
and ritual associations. What is constructed as a corpus
of knowledge by these means creates a characteristic way
of knowing that might be described in externalist lan-
guage as poetic—a visual symphony that represents the
ancestrally granted mystery of growth as something that
covertly permeates nature and creates mankind’s daily
food.
It follows from the basic criterion of validity—that
these are secrets transmitted from the ancestors before
they died—that such knowledge should be unchanging.
Yet the regional variation and the slight changes I could
unearth within the Baktaman tradition bespeak the pres-
ence of flux and change. And, as we have known since
the pathbreaking study by Latour and Woolgar (1979) of
knowledge production in a modern biochemical labo-
ratory, the strictest of methodological and theoretical
principles of validity are profoundly reshaped by the prag-
matics of social organization and performance.
What, then, might be the characteristic processes of
knowledge production and change in an Ok tradition of
knowledge? To look for clues we should place ourselves
in the position of the key actor, in this case the senior
initiator, who has the responsibility to re-create this
symphony of the ancestors before the eyes of the novices.
It would have been a long time—a plausible minimum
of five years and often more like ten years—since the
cult master was last asked to perform this initiation.
Meanwhile, he had stored the knowledge in his memory,
secret and tabooed and perilous, without opportunities
for intermittent idle talk about the secrets or any no-
tational system or mnemonic devices other than the sa-
cred objects themselves to remember it by.
The initiation makes up a many-day, complex ritual
sequence with considerable dramatic nerve. Now the
cult master is supposed to make its secrets of the an-
cestors suddenly and powerfully manifest, shaping the
messages in the visual idioms to make them compelling
so that they will do their work to induce fertility and
inform and transform the novices. This is emphatically
not an occasion for personal invention, which would
compromise the messages’ validity as the visions of the
ancestors. Yet a mere mechanical repetition of the ritual
of many years ago may not be adequate, even if the cult
master were capable of the rote memory needed: it has
to be a re-creation of revelation, with the force to compel
the audience of both novices and more advanced know-
ers. In such a situation, one would expect the cult master,
in an honest effort to reproduce the mystery, to be very
concerned to secure a maximally effective performance.
This means that he must try to enhance the ritual in the
ways that are possible: highlight the poetry of the images
and their harmonization, pitch the emotive register so
as to move the audience maximally, and model the rep-
resentations of cosmological ideas as clearly and graph-
ically as possible to intensify their thrust.
A set of cross-pressures thus seems to frame the ritual
performance and thereby its possible trajectories of
change over time. Its character as revealed and trans-
mitted knowledge means that it should be stable, and
because there are other knowing seniors present besides
the novices changes can at most be moderate and incre-
mental. This also means that the trajectory of change
will be path-dependent, since it is its latest performance
that at every step defines the fount of tradition. The
nature of the medium requires that its idioms resonate
emotionally and vividly with the audience, so the pre-
cision of the message can be relatively low but the im-
portance of its illocutionary force is great. One would
expect the substantive effort and thus the marginal
changes in the knowledge in such a situation to focus
on the richness of harmonization of idioms, the consis-
tency and coherence of secret knowledge, and the shock
and surprise value of new revelations to the novices, and
therefore paradoxes and the ambiguities of deeper truths
hidden behind overt appearances or previous deceptions
will be at a premium. Only thus can the mystery be
reproduced, and thereby will its slow trajectory of cre-
ativity and change be determined.
Both the known variety of traditional cults in the Ok
area and the micro-details of marginal changes in the
practices of the Baktaman seem to support the predic-
tions of the model I have presented. The extensive and
complex ethnographic materials in which I try to show
this to be the case have been published and must be
judged in a larger context than can be provided here. My
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purpose in putting this brief sketch before you is to show
the kinds of claims I make by means of an analysis based
on this model of knowledge production and transmis-
sion. I am certainly not proposing that the specific dy-
namics of the Ok traditions of secret knowledge can pro-
vide us with a paradigm for other, or all, knowledge
systems. My main point is that in these materials we
can see the three faces of knowledge coming into play
and asserting their influence on each other and on the
shape of the tradition. These are processes that should
be visible in the moments of manifestation of any tra-
dition of knowledge when the pressures and empower-
ments of its social organization, the constraints and po-
tentials of its medium, and the elements of knowledge
in its corpus impinge on each other.
Coherence, Precision, and Generality in
Traditions of Knowledge
In these materials from the Baktaman and their neigh-
bours we have dealt with very small-scale processes of
transmission, involving a few score persons at a time in
single chains of performances in small communities
with very limited intercommunication with neighbours.
Circumstances become quite different where large pop-
ulations partake in a broader flow of knowledge within
a diverse and multisited tradition. The most obtrusive
questions under such circumstances seem to be three:
the nature of subdivisions in the total body of what peo-
ple know, that is, the separate branches of knowledge
that coexist in the population; the degree of standardi-
zation and sharing of knowledge that is produced within
each branch; and the form and degree of ideational pre-
cision, coherence, and generality that is developed and
maintained in each branch. These are issues I shall try
to explore in connection with ethnographic materials
from North Bali.
First, the issue of branches of knowledge: In a complex
civilization such as that of Bali it makes descriptive
sense to divide the totality of knowledge into separable
traditions. By this I mean not the cognitive domains of
the linguist ethnographer—or, indeed, the taxonomically
inclined native—but the bodies of knowledge that are
socially instituted. Among Balinese one finds many pro-
fessions and many specialities, each of which produces
and sustains—and often seeks to monopolize—sectors of
specific knowledge. Some of these sectors of knowledge
belong to larger traditions with different geographical
and historical roots and indeed clearly different criteria
of validity. In the treatment of sick patients, for example,
one finds Bali-Hindu priests, balian healers, Muslim
teachers, and bio-medical doctors proceeding in their
characteristic ways on the basis of the knowledge they
use and linked in different directions with broader
traditions of knowledge such as Bali-Hinduism, sorcery,
Islam, and Western medical science.
Each such tradition might be inspected by the anthro-
pological analyst for its implicit logic and conceptual
structure, but I wish to avoid the usual circular argument
that explains their characteristics by means of whatever
logic and structure we as ethnographers abstract from
their empirical content. Our analysis becomes more il-
luminating if we are able to identify the salient processes
of production, reproduction, and use of knowledge that
take place and shape the forms of knowledge. These pro-
cesses will be lodged in the social organization of au-
thorities, practitioners, and clients, in the instituted
modes of recruitment and replacement of personnel, and
in the forms of communication by which each corpus of
knowledge is taught, learned, applied, and marginally
changed. Moreover, an analysis along the lines of dis-
aggregation that I have outlined will show that each of
these many traditions has a characteristic constitutive
dynamic that arises internally from the interaction of its
three faces. Although most individuals in Bali participate
simultaneously in several distinct traditions, the empir-
ical materials indicate that endogenous processes within
each tradition generate most of these features and that
cross-influences between traditions are far less evident.
Let me focus mainly on Bali-Hinduism, since it is cur-
rently unique to Bali and therefore one degree less com-
plex than most of the others in that internal processes
within Bali can be said to determine its present dynam-
ics. The sum of Bali-Hinduism makes up an enormous
corpus of knowledge—a complex and varied set of be-
liefs, skills, and practices. Its favoured subjects are far
more comprehensive than what we found in the New
Guinea example in that it embraces nature and cosmos,
health and life, ethnopsychology and human morality,
and a panoply of supernatural entities that erratically
affect and may even invade and possess human beings.
The question I wish to raise is the extent to which and
the sense in which this Bali-Hindu superfluity of cos-
mology, ritual, morality, and religion can be described
as a coherent system of learning and, if so, the nature of
its coherence—the character of its systematicity. It
strikes me that such a question cannot even be raised in
the context of anthropology’s usual “cultural analysis,”
where the assumed fact of unity serves as an unques-
tioned premise to frame the investigation. In such a ho-
listic analysis, the analyst is usually content to look at
a few key representations, explicate their overt structure,
and give an interpretation of the ideas, meanings, and
symbols that they convey. Looking at it as a tradition of
knowledge, however, we should be able to disaggregate
the knowledge into its three faces and investigate its
constituting processes, thereby laying bare the proper
dynamics that generate the tradition’s separation from
other traditions, its corpus, and the nature of whatever
coherence may obtain within it. Again, I must be content
to illustrate and explicate a few steps of my analysis only,
referring the critical reader to a more extensive ethnog-
raphy published elsewhere (Barth 1990, 1993).
In a complex ethnography, it is convenient to start
with the instituted social organization to map out the
fields of social action, though any one of the three faces
of knowledge could in principle serve as our point of
entry. On the highest level of organization, the premise
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of Bali-Hindu cosmology is that Bali belongs to the
gods—not all of Bali to a single pantheon of gods but
each locality and function to a separate god/aspect of
godhead. Each god has one or more local temples or
shrines within temples, and there are in Bali an esti-
mated 20,000 temples. Every temple is maintained by a
local congregation and led by a priest.
The temples are the main arenas of Bali-Hindu wor-
ship in which Bali-Hindu knowledge is collectively ob-
jectified, but there are many other arenas in which it is
applied, discussed, and taught, such as in sacred text-
reading study groups, informal talk, the rites of passage
of family members, theatre and puppet performances,
private ritual, and moral discussion and debate. Children
and young people are not encouraged to delve deeply into
these questions lest they go mad, and adult engagements
usually take place in organized forms led by an instituted
authority. But these authorities make up a strikingly
multifarious set. There are the sacred text fragments that
are read only in restricted, ritual situations; there are
Brahmana priests of inordinate social rank and endoga-
mous high-caste origin who perform passage rites and
consecrate new temples; there are village priests who
direct the worship in every public temple; there are bal-
ian healers; there are puppeteers and travelling troops of
ritual performers; there are temple possession mediums
and private consulting mediums; and of course there are
innumerable descent-group priests and family elders, as
well as episodes of spontaneous possession in every con-
gregation. An even more striking feature is that among
the temple priests of Bali there is no system of training
and authorization and no centralized or regional control
of the incumbency of priesthood and priestly posts. Suc-
cession to the office of priest in a temple is determined
autonomously by the congregation of each temple, var-
iously by succession within patrilines, by popular elec-
tion within the congregation, or by selection by the god
through a possessed medium.
Such a social organization for a large-scale tradition of
knowledge raises a number of challenging issues. The
most salient questions are (1) What can ensure any degree
of continuity in the corpus of knowledge in Bali-Hin-
duism when the system for the training of its profes-
sionals is so singularly rudimentary? and (2) What can
ensure any degree of coherence and consistency within
that corpus when it seems to leave spaces wide open for
erratic local innovation?
On the first point, it should be emphasized that a tem-
ple priest is expected to lead the most elaborate public
rituals with what look and sound like complex liturgies:
mantras in Sanskrit, Old Balinese, and Javanese, offer-
ings, purifications, and blessings, the production and ma-
nipulation of intricate ritual objects, and so forth. I have
a number of vivid testimonies from current priests who
claim to have been taken aback and totally unprepared
to be suddenly designated the successor of a deceased
incumbent in a temple session where the possessed me-
dium pointed god’s finger at him or the congregation
suddenly demanded his consent. As a limitation on this
apparent anarchy, these same accounts may mention
help to the novice priest from the priests of other temples
but also direct inspiration from the god and honorable
and successful improvisation. There is likewise the cir-
cumstance to consider that Bali-Hinduism allows a great
degree of particularism and localization of ritual injunc-
tions, whereby spontaneous irregularities will affect the
totality of the tradition less than they would in a more
globalized system. Yet I cannot resist speculating on
what might, for example, be the nature of continuity in
our own discipline if professors were appointed in similar
fashion.
The other challenge concerns how a degree of coher-
ence and consistency within the tradition’s corpus of
knowledge can be evolved and sustained under such con-
ditions of erratic innovation. Most threatening to any
priestly and disciplined cultivation of sacred knowledge
would seem the practice whereby gods regularly descend
among their congregation and speak directly to people
through possessed mediums, on an unpredictable and
potentially unlimited range of subjects, at every full
moon in 20,000 temples throughout Bali. There are cer-
tain institutionalized brakes on these events: the priest
holds the authority to translate or interpret obscure
statements by the possessed medium, and if the per-
formance gets totally out of hand he may also diagnose
the event as a case of possession by an evil spirit/devil
falsely posing as the god of the temple. Yet I have been
present in a session where a well-established priest made
no attempt to divert the god from speaking through the
temple medium and scolding his priest for ritual errors,
until the errant priest finally dissolved in hysterical
sobbing.
Moreover, the presence of such a large cadre of temple
priests, each independently authorized and engaging his
flock in worship, religious speculation. and moral in-
struction, might seem an equally potent threat to any
unity of dogma and cosmology. How can we imagine that
a religion with such a social organization can speak with
one voice and maintain and transmit a consistent and
coherent corpus of learning by means of its segmented
multitude of priestly authorities? Considering the his-
torical battles and not infrequent failures to do so in an
organization as massive as the Catholic Church,
equipped as it is with its holy and authorized text, its
seminars, investitures, and councils, and its disciplines
and excommunications, the situation of the Bali-Hindu
tradition seems indeed precarious. At issue are both the
degree of standardization and agreement on knowledge
between members or authorities within Bali-Hinduism
and the kinds of coherence, logical or otherwise, that can
be maintained between the items that compose Bali-
Hindu knowledge.
Balinese themselves do seem to value the idea that
everything must be exactly right. In social life, one begs
forgiveness “if I may have made a mistake,” and ritual
errors can have catastrophic consequences. Moral and
philosophical debate likewise often involves abstract
principles and systematizing logic. The ideology thus
seems to embrace standards of rigour and exactness as
paramount ideals. But what might provide the exacting
8 F current anthropology Volume 43, Number 1, February 2002
standards by which to judge error and correctness? Given
the imprecision of the media through which Bali-Hindu
knowledge is largely objectified (ritual objects, blessings,
obscure mantras, vivid art forms, a cast of mythical and
theatrical figures), such a declared ideal may indeed be
a trifle spurious. And the ambiguity of representations
is only exacerbated by some general Balinese philosoph-
ical tenets, for example, that everything in the world is
in a state of flux and if its current instantiation drifts
too far towards one extreme it may flip to the opposite
extreme or that any one form or phenomenon may, in a
particular situation, appear as a manifestation of an ap-
parently quite different phenomenon.
A traditional ethnographic procedure would be to
search for empirical regularities in the ethnography of
Bali so as to ascertain the extent of agreement that ob-
tains between Bali-Hindu authorities and to abstract the
common principles on which their knowledge is based
from a systematic inventory of that knowledge. But
nothing like the necessary data for such an assessment
are available: ethnographies have hardly scratched the
surface of local and regional variation or expressive
wealth contained in the Bali-Hindu tradition. Might we,
then, try to do as I did with the New Guinea materials
referred to above and look for processes of knowledge
production, innovation, and marginal change? Again, the
surfeit of productivity in the variety of representations
and expressions militates against establishing any kind
of canon or time line against which marginal empirical
innovations and changes could be identified and mea-
sured.
But perhaps the whole issue I raise is contrived and
too narrowly conceived. Speaking of “knowledge” we
too easily focus on generalization, consistency, and a log-
ical coherence in which an ideal system of knowledge
is seen as one which derived its corpus from a few ab-
stract principles by systematic deduction. But knowledge
in its different modalities can range from an assemblage
of disconnected empirical detail to a “theory of every-
thing,” and even among ourselves in the West it is prob-
ably greatly weighted towards the former rather than the
latter form. Consider, for example, the details of houses,
trees, slopes, and paths that we carry about in our minds
regarding every neighbourhood we “know” and how con-
stantly in use its ungeneralized detail is in our daily lives;
consider the mass of specific empirical information that
we file under rather simple taxonomies of animals and
plants. So let us return to basics and ask first just how
Bali-Hinduism is used as knowledge, that is, “used to
interpret and act on the world.”
Observing and listening to people using it shows us
that it is mainly employed to interpret a social and moral
world—indeed, one that embraces far more than the
moral world which a Western person constructs—and to
act socially and virtuously in it. And the rigour and ex-
actness that persons cultivate are concerned precisely
with these social and moral aspects, not with the phys-
ical and material. The enormously elaborate represen-
tations, towers, and offerings at a cremation, for example,
must be intended to be scrupulously correct to avoid
ritual error and disaster but not necessarily so in their
actual physical execution to avoid the dire consequences
of error. Most of the ritual objects are subcontracted and
produced by others, and then it is their producers, not
the sponsors of the ceremonies and offerings, who will
suffer the consequences of any ritual error that might
occur. Indeed, if they are executed with rigour, care, and
good intentions, even their producers will probably es-
cape the bad consequences of errors. Or other escape
devices may obtain. For example, in the case of exhu-
mation for cremation, it is vitally important that all the
bones of the buried person be retrieved and burned. But
one may choose merely to take a handful of earth from
the grave, which then “symbolically” stands for the
whole and complete skeleton. We are in a world con-
structed on principles of sociality and morality, not me-
chanical causality.
The power of such a system of knowledge should
therefore be measured in terms of the productivity of the
images, insights, and explanations that it provides for
reflection and action on the complexities of interper-
sonal relations and of individual health and success and
disaster, not in the rigour of its abstract generalizations
about an impersonal, physical cosmos. And its coherence
will be located more in its social organization and in the
communicative medium and images it offers than in the
abstract logic governing its corpus. Bali-Hinduism pro-
vides a singularly rich vocabulary and set of images for
discourses and judgements on worshipfulness and co-
operation, virtue and evil, harmony and danger. The role
of its priesthood and the pressure on each priest and
religious paragon is to maintain that productivity and
engage the congregations in their ritual work. It is not
to work out a consistent set of dogmas or abstract gen-
eralizations about the world. Thus, the particular kind
of composition that characterizes its corpus arises not
from a failure for other purposes but from the strengths
that the medium of representation and the dynamics of
the social organization provide to those who apply it in
action.
Modern Academic Knowledge
Any attempt to give a general account of knowledge
must be reflexively applicable to its own pursuits—in
this case, both to academic knowledge in general and to
our own anthropology in particular. But can the simple
perspective I have used to approach Ok cosmology and
Bali-Hindu thought illuminate modern academic knowl-
edge?
I am treading here on treacherous ground, where any
statement is easily read as signalling one or another of
the familiar, contestable positions in the debates that
have preoccupied Western philosophers and methodol-
ogists for centuries. Yet I may need to make my preju-
dices clear. To my understanding, modern academic
knowledge is a way of knowing that has emerged his-
torically through the union of a number of ideas. It hails
from the Enlightenment and rationalist individualism.
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Its global systemization through what Latour (1987) calls
“centers of calculation” nurtured its spectacular accu-
mulation, scope, and power. Its emergent idea of re-
search, in the strict sense of systematic procedures for
producing previously unknown knowledge, implied a
radical shift from the ideals of scholarship found in other
literate traditions, which valorize the encyclopedic com-
mand of existing bodies of knowledge. The ideological
and organizational features of this vision of knowledge
were perhaps most clearly epitomized in the Humbold-
tian university concept. I take it as indisputable that the
resulting forms of knowledge have proved immensely
effective and have revolutionized much of modern
thought and modern political economy.
An anthropological perspective invites us to go beyond
the narrower questions of scientific methodology, or
truth and rationality, and instead observe the overall cir-
culation and deployment of modern knowledge—the in-
terleaved phases of its construction, representation, dis-
tribution, and reproduction and the uses made of it by
positioned actors and teams. This is congruent with the
approach I used to analyse Ok and Balinese materials,
where I focused on their representation and transmission
of knowledge and their practices of use, not on a critique
of underlying methodological principles. A similar per-
spective on modern knowledge makes it fully amenable
to the approach for which I plead. I thus see no problem
in disaggregating sectors of academic knowledge into the
same three faces as other knowledge: the bodies of sub-
stantive assertions it contains, the characteristic media
and representations in which it is cast and communi-
cated, and the social organization within which its ac-
tivities take place. We then observe their interplay, es-
pecially in the criteria of validity and the constraints on
performance that are generated not in an imaginary and
universalized space but in the particular moments of re-
alization of action.
Looking separately at the media of representation and
communication allows us to discover how very unlike
each other the different branches of academic knowledge
are. Mathematical knowledge has its computations,
gross anatomy its atlases, microbiology its technical ap-
paratus and chemical models, and so on. These repre-
sentations shape both thought and action and thus the
practices of scholars in different disciplines. Emily Mar-
tin (1987, 1994; Kirschner 1999) has furthermore uncov-
ered the role of broader networks of ideas and framing
metaphors in how science is represented: the language
of industrial production in reproductive medicine (and
the hidden curriculum of traditional gender knowledge
that it incorporates), the images of war games and the
body boundary anxieties that permeate immunology. Be-
sides shaping popular knowledge in these fields, such
imagery must also affect the construction of research
projects and thereby the production of new knowledge.
There is much empirical and analytical work to be done
along such lines in each of the different, particular dis-
ciplines of science, humanities, and social science.
Clearly distinguishing the modes of representation
from the organizational face of knowledge also allows us
a clearer picture of resulting practices within universities
and disciplines. As in the case of Ok cosmology and Bali-
Hindu thought, what might seem relatively minor de-
tails of social organization can have, I suggest, great im-
pact on the academic knowledge that is produced and
husbanded. Some evidence of these effects in our own
discipline in Britain have recently been discussed under
the heading of “audit culture” (Shore and Wright 1999).
In contrast to Humboldt’s heroic scenario of original,
critical research pursued by autonomously driven schol-
ars, the short-term gains of “research and development”
have played an increasing role in university rhetoric of
self-justification. Continuing this trend, we are currently
seeing a trivialization of the work done in universities
in Britain and elsewhere under the pressure of demands
for justification through “public accountability.” A so-
cial democratic concern for the usefulness of the uni-
versity’s services to society and a neoliberal suspicion of
the efficiency of the use of funds in any institution not
directly related to the market combine to demand such
accountability through procedures that monitor univer-
sity research and teaching by “quality assessment.” To
this end a political technology of self-monitoring, audits,
and other “quality assurance initiatives” has been in-
stituted. According to Shore and Wright (1999:565), by
the 1990s every British anthropology department was
subject to a cycle of academic audit one year, a compet-
itive ranking of research output the next year, and a
teaching-quality assessment the third year. Any unsat-
isfactory department was given 12 months to remedy its
position, after which core funding and student places for
that unit were withdrawn. By 1997, two further agencies
were designed: an institute for the accreditation of aca-
demic teachers, which expected faculty to devote five to
eight days per annum to “remaining in good standing,”
and an ambitious quality-assurance agency to standard-
ize degrees, set subject benchmarks, formulate target
outcomes for each programme in each institution, name
academic reviewers for each discipline, and scrutinize
quality-assurance mechanisms in each institution on a
six-yearly cycle.
What is put in the hands of this bureaucratic leviathan
is nothing less than the power to replace and reshape the
criteria of validity governing anthropological knowledge
in Britain. If traditional scholarly criteria of validity have
not been totally eclipsed, they certainly will be signifi-
cantly supplemented by this regime. The only way for
scholars to survive in such a situation, Shore and Wright
point out, is to design their research with the measuring
instruments of the quality-assessment bureaucracy in
mind and create a paper trail to provide evidence of per-
formance that is measurable and will give a positive
score. Thus, inevitably, the design of the measuring in-
strument defines what will be valued. Since the organ-
ization controls resources and the granting of legitimacy,
the criteria of validity for British anthropology will, from
now on, represent a balance between the simplicities
imposed by the measuring capacity of the audit mech-
anism and the vicissitudes of patronage and factionalism
among the select few who hold positions in its bureau-
10 F current anthropology Volume 43, Number 1, February 2002
cracy. It seems discouragingly safe to expect less imag-
ination and creativity and more triviality from scholars
governed by this regime, and to that extent the model
predicts the trajectory of anthropological knowledge in
Britain.
The technology of reviews and academic audits will
be familiar to all of us. Yet there is reason to hope that
its effects on scholarly performance in, for example, the
United States will be less than in Britain. Control is
somewhat less centralized in American academia, and
much arbitrary power is held by individual university
presidents. Paradoxically, this may favour the conditions
of creativity among colleagues in America. The perform-
ance of a university president is, after all, in part judged
by the president’s proximity to academic excellence and
fame, and entrepreneurial success in recruiting famous
faculty enhances the president’s own status. This in turn
sets up a quest for fame among scholars in every disci-
pline, allowing a different set of criteria of validity for
the knowledge they produce and a different structure of
rewards. The quality-assessment technologies may
therefore prove to have both fewer uses and less levelling
effects in America than in Britain.
General Reflections
Unsurprisingly, it emerges from the preceding section
that the perspective I have applied to the analysis of Ok
and Balinese knowledge can be used to illuminate sig-
nificant aspects of academic knowledge as well. That
must be so, as I see it, because its first and basic move
is to set up dimensions of description (corpus, medium,
social organization) that are based on truisms about all
knowledge. The issue is where a more comprehensive
and detailed analysis along these lines might take us in
our understanding of how academic knowledge works.
In my small example above, I focussed on a few features
of the social organization of universities and anthropol-
ogy and on the criteria of validity and the practices that
they generate, not on an analysis of methodology in the
strict sense. In this respect, my mode of approach is
somewhat like what since the 1970s has been called the
“strong program” in science studies (Barnes, Bloor, and
Henry 1996), characterized especially by its agnosticism
with respect to the truth or falsity of specific items of
knowledge.4
But my purposes are different: an exploration of the
ethnographies of human knowledge, in the forms that
4. Or see the principles articulated by Bloor (1991:7): “1. It would
be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about
belief or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types
of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate in bringing
about beliefs.
“2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, ra-
tionality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these di-
chotomies will require explanation.
“3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same
types of causes would explain, say, true and false beliefs.
“4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation
would have to be applicable to sociology itself.”
they patently have in various human populations, rather
than a normative critique or expose´ of how scientific
research is pursued. Obviously, it would not be very fruit-
ful for anthropologists to study the varieties of human
knowledge only to dismiss most of them for faulty
method. People construct their worlds by their knowl-
edge and live by it, and therefore an anthropology of
knowledge should ask how these varieties are variously
produced, represented, transmitted, and applied. This ac-
count must be “relativist,” of course, and will have only
marginal and limited use for concepts of truth and falsity,
rationality and irrationality. Truth is not the bottom line
(Putnam 1981:130). But such a relativism certainly does
not mean that “anything goes”—pace Feyerabend (1975).
The illustrations I have given suggest that each tradition
of knowledge will be characterized by distinct and in
their own ways stringent criteria of valid-
ity—presumably in some kind of systematic relation to
the uses to which that knowledge is put.
Much of the controversy around the strong program
in science studies arises from the objection by many nat-
ural scientists that such an approach misses the whole
point of science: its discovery of truth through its en-
gagement with nature itself as the external referee and
thus the ultimate explanation of all scientific knowledge
(Sokal and Bricmont 1998:85, 97). Now, all knowledge,
as noted in the definition, engages “nature” in that it is
used to interpret and act on the world, and we need to
be precise and discriminating in our description of how
different representations of knowledge and different so-
ciologies are linked to different practices of application
to nature. Baktaman cultivators pile leaves and uprooted
vegetation around their taro plants because “the taro
likes the smell of rotting vegetation.” They doubtless
have accumulated agronomical experience that this prac-
tice affects the world, that is, the growth of taro. They
do not pursue their representation further to determine
if it is indeed the smell and not some other consequence
of their practice that makes the taro thrive. But the image
of representation that they use seems perfectly adequate
in motivating their mulching practice. What sense would
it make for us to translate their image literally and then
fault it as if it motivated practices that they do not fol-
low? I propose that in our description of knowledge we
need to be very meticulous in our recording of how items
of knowledge are connected with—no: are part of—
specific practices. We should not, in the fashion of early
ethnographers, lose ourselves in what strikes us as the
bizarre imagery.
Will such meticulousness allow us to disregard nature
as the tribunal of knowledge and explain the content and
trajectory of knowledge purely by social and represen-
tational factors? Certainly not, if we have the hubris to
wish to explain human knowledge ex nihilo. But a social
and representational description will take us a long way
in specifying the pathways of feedback from action on
the world—from nature—to socially positioned thinking
and acting persons, reaping experience that is profoundly
shaped by the specific tasks, purposes, and representa-
tions of knowledge that they construct. Thus if our idea
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of change is one of a marginal change—like a differential
equation of what is happening—then we can, or rather
we must, bring a battery of those persons’ presumptions
and schemas for interpreting the apparent results of ac-
tion to bear on what new knowledge may ensue. Raw
nature obtains very limited access and at best only a
small voice through this tight grid of human construc-
tions.
But perhaps some persons are as literal-minded as the
old ethnographers were and use conventional represen-
tations to think in unconventional contexts. Baktaman
cultivators sometimes wonder, as I found them doing,
whether, given that the taro can smell, it can also hear.
(It probably cannot see, because it is beneath the ground.)
Smell also plays a certain role in their ritual: they blow
wild ginger in contexts that I never felt I understood.
Perhaps odor serves as a model, an image, for action at
a distance—a problem I once heard them spontaneously
address in wondering how it was that the ancestral skull
in the temple could effect growth in the taro of distant
gardens. Change in every tradition of knowledge surely
arises from within it, through idle speculation, and by
transposing models and mixing metaphors, as well as
from the external feedbacks from the world that are in-
terpreted in experience. Such speculation must press on
the boundaries of conventional knowledge. Can we dis-
cover and describe the specific form of the reality checks
that such speculation runs into? Surely, the very fact that
change in traditions of knowledge is demonstrably path-
dependent shows us that these human constructions are
not subject to any massively external test of nature and
that we need a much less simplistic way to model the
interpenetration of a corpus of knowledge and its set of
applications to action on the world.
To unravel more of the processes and dynamics of the
human varieties in knowledge, it seems that we have an
unending program of discovery and analysis ahead of us.
Comments
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Barth has managed a significant conceptual achievement
in proposing to develop a comparative ethnographic anal-
ysis on “how bodies of knowledge are produced in per-
sons and populations, in the context of the social rela-
tions that they sustain.” In this proposal he identifies
three interconnected faces of knowledge: a substantive
corpus of assertions, a range of media of representation,
and social organization. This schematic framework of-
fers new insights on the interpersonal and cognitive
foundations of cultural meanings.
Many social psychologists have sought to identify the
interpersonal factors that determine knowledge distri-
bution, forms of coherence in shared knowledge, and the
trajectory of change in cultural meanings. I agree with
Barth that meaning construction, transmission, and ap-
plication in daily social transactions are symbolic ac-
tions that take place among socially situated persons
with particular communicative intentions. In psychol-
ogy, the preferred subject of theoretical discourse is men-
tal process. Robert Krauss and I have articulated the so-
cial cognitive processes that mediate the development
of shared meanings. Our claims (1998:53) are as follows:
Using language to represent a state of affairs can
evoke or create an internal representation that dif-
fers from the internal representations of the same
state of affairs evoked or created by other means of
encoding. The internal representations evoked or
created by language use can affect a language user’s
subsequent cognitions. The form that a linguistic
representation takes will be affected by the contexts
of language use, including the ground rules and as-
sumptions that govern usage; audience design; and
the immediate, ongoing, and emerging properties of
the communication situation. Through communica-
tion, the private cognitions of individuals can be
made public and directed toward a shared represen-
tation of the referent.
These claims link the use of language in communi-
cation to the emergence of socially shared cognitions,
which are core elements of cultural meaning systems.
As Langacker (1967) argues, when a thought is translated
into a speech the speaker must cast it in a form that is
appropriate for linguistic operations and pertinent to
the communication function. Thus, interpersonal com-
munication is the primary process by which private
thoughts are socialized. Audience design in communi-
cation provides a good illustration of how a private idea
is transformed into a shared representation. Typically, a
communicative message is addressed to an actual or po-
tential audience and has been formulated to be under-
standable by that audience. Regardless of whether the
audience consists of some specific other person, a spec-
ifiable collection of individuals (students in an intro-
ductory anthropology lecture), or a category of individ-
uals (readers of current anthropology), in formulating
communicative messages a speaker must take the ad-
dressee’s knowledge, beliefs, and motives into account.
Speakers describing the Star Ferry Terminal in Hong
Kong refer to it differently depending on the listener’s
apparent familiarity with Hong Kong. Thus, inevitably
the speaker will modify the communicative message in
the direction of the assumed knowledge of the listener.
Moreover, the verbal representation of the referent in the
communicative message could overshadow the speaker’s
original mental representation of the referent. Verbal
overshadowing is particularly important for internali-
zation of shared representations because it enables
shared representations established in communication to
replace private representations.
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As Barth mentions, people sharing a cultural context
are positioned in a common social organization and par-
ticipate in similar social practices. Because communi-
cative acts are goal-directed behaviors, culturally salient
perlocutionary intentions (intentions to bring about
some particular consequence by an act of speaking) may
also constrain the pattern of language use within a cul-
tural group, evoking similar linguistic representations
and giving rise to shared meanings.
In short, there are different metaphors and modes of
discourse in anthropology and social psychology for de-
scribing the “processes and dynamics of the human va-
rieties in knowledge.” An interdisciplinary perspective
might offer a more complete picture with different layers
of detail and generality. One facet of Barth’s conceptual
accomplishment is that he offers a concrete analytic
framework for establishing common ground for the two
disciplines to communicate their insights on how cul-
tural meanings develop and change in interpersonal
transactions.
lars rodseth
Department of Anthropology, University of Utah, 270
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While he is still best known for his early work on po-
litical leadership and ethnic identity, Fredrik Barth has
now devoted the majority of his long career to the an-
thropology of knowledge. We can detect the beginnings
of this project as early as 1966, when he wrote, “The
problem as I see it is to understand how any degree of
systematization and consistency is established and
maintained between the different values that coexist in
a culture” (1966:12). Rejecting structuralist and func-
tionalist accounts that attribute cultural integration
merely to logical or psychological consistency, Barth set
out to investigate the creation of consistency through
personal transactions and other social processes. He took
as his inspiration a statement by Boas, originally pub-
lished in 1896: “If anthropology desires to establish the
laws governing the growth of culture it must not confine
itself to comparing the results of growth alone, but when-
ever such is feasible it must compare the processes of
growth” (Boas 1940:280, emphasis added; cf. Barth 1966:
22).
Comparing processes of cultural growth is exactly
what Barth has done in New Guinea and Bali (not to
mention the several other societies in which he has con-
ducted fieldwork over the past 35 years). The resulting
monographs (Barth 1975, 1987, 1993) and articles (e.g.,
1989, 1990, 1992) constitute an exemplary body of work,
perhaps the single most important model for empirical
research within the emerging neo-Boasian paradigm (e.g.,
Rodseth 1998, Bunzl 1999, Lewis 2001). Here I would
like to focus on the Boasian metaphor of “growth” as a
way of analyzing both the scope and the limits of Barth’s
anthropology of knowledge.
The concept of growth is deeply ambiguous. It col-
lapses together the notion of development, such as the
growth of trees or children, and the notion of spread,
such as the growth of an epidemic or a religious tradition.
Both kinds of phenomena may be described as “growth,”
but the first kind implies gradual change within a
bounded and persisting system (like a human body),
while the second implies more or less faithful replication
within an ever-shifting social network. When Barth in-
vestigates the growth of knowledge, which kind of
growth does he have in mind?
Taken by itself, his Mintz Lecture might lead one to
think that Barth is mainly interested in the first sense
of growth, that is, development within a system—the
system of knowledge, in this case, found within a given
society. Indeed, for present purposes, he deliberately
omits the many “exogenous factors” that he knows must
impinge upon the “systemic local processes” that he is
attempting to model. Such strategic simplification is a
necessary step—if not a necessary evil—in all model
building, and there is little doubt that Barth gains in-
sights into endogenous processes by temporarily ignoring
exogenous ones. In particular, he is able to shed consid-
erable light on the issues of (1) how knowledge in the
Ok region has changed and diversified, given the su-
preme value that the Baktaman place on cultural con-
tinuity, and (2) what makes Balinese knowledge persist
and cohere over such a wide area when there is no
churchlike authority to curb “erratic local innovation.”
Both change and persistence are seen here as endoge-
nously determined processes, as in the growth of a tree
or a child.
Yet a careful reading of Barth’s other works, especially
Cosmologies in the Making (1987) and “The Guru and
the Conjurer” (1990), makes it clear that he is intensely
interested in cultural growth as a distributed process—a
matter of knowledge spreading from individual to indi-
vidual within a social network and perhaps spilling from
one network to another through the activities of “gurus”
and other long-distance travelers. To balance our image
of Barth’s approach, it is worth remembering his em-
phasis in an earlier context on the way knowledge often
slips the grid of existing institutions: “I wish to grasp
general features of the management and transmission of
knowledge, and the resulting informational economy of
communities and regions, not the structure of particular
instituted relations” (1990:648). A related aspect of
Barth’s approach is his emphasis on the factors that make
some forms of knowledge more “portable” or more
“catching” than others (see also Sperber 1996). In the
Mintz Lecture we see how a corpus of knowledge is de-
pendent on endogenous media and social organization;
what we do not see in any detail is how a given idea or
assertion escapes that corpus of knowledge and spreads
beyond its original medium and social milieu. The lim-
itation of this approach has been identified by Barth him-
self (1990:641), and the question he posed in that earlier
context is especially fitting for an occasion honoring Sid-
ney Mintz: “How might we do better, and start building
a social anthropology which could inform regional and
historical syntheses, and thereby achieve the dynamic
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character needed to give an account of variable and
changing humanity?”
john robb
Department of Archaeology, Cambridge University,
Cambridge CB2 3DZ, U.K. (jer39@cam.ac.uk). 2 x 01
Whether we call the object of our study “culture” or
“knowledge,” what matters is how well our conceptu-
alization of it can elucidate a particular situation. Barth’s
formulation is especially fruitful because it isolates four
very important points: (a) that we need to consider dis-
cursive and non-discursive knowledge together rather
than separately; (b) that people within a single group
participate differentially in multiple social knowledges,
which thus become a social resource; (c) that the repro-
duction of knowledge is an act of agency situated in
unique circumstances; and (d) that we can seek to ex-
plain the long-term history of knowledge in terms of
cumulative generations of reproduction.
Because this perspective is potentially applicable to
many media and kinds of knowledge, it raises exciting
new questions for history and archaeology. If one views
material things as products and instruments of bodies of
knowledge which are neither unquestioningly repro-
duced nor unalterable, then Barth’s vision can supply one
bridge for linking the micro-sociology of social action
with the creation of long-term historical traditions. For
example, some archaeologists have begun to consider
material culture in terms of how the knowledge required
to produce it is maintained and reproduced. Perle´s (2001)
provides one example: Would an inland community in
the Greek Early Neolithic have been able to maintain a
complex and detailed body of seafaring knowledge by
engaging in very few voyages with long gaps between
them? A similar approach is inherent in many symbolic
interpretations of material-culture change; the long cen-
turies of remodeling monuments such as Stonehenge
must be interpreted as a historical trajectory of change
created by generations of ritual participants speaking an
inherited language of stones. It is especially interesting
to consider “knowledge about knowledge” (Barth’s “cri-
teria for validity”)—for instance, which genres of knowl-
edge must be adhered to rigidly and which allow free
play of improvisation and elaboration. This kind of gen-
erative agent-oriented approach is absolutely necessary
for any kind of regional analysis of cultural variation (as
Barth’s own work [1987] illustrates wonderfully; cf.
Knauft 1993), especially where “phenotypic” differences
in cultural practices have clearly arisen from common
roots (for example, Robb 2001).
What is more difficult is to determine the limits of
this approach. Although Barth notes that his definition
of “knowledge” overlaps with anthropologists’ tradi-
tional definition of “culture,” in practice his analytical
strategy limits the depth with which knowledge pene-
trates the actors. In other words, it separates actors from
the act of knowing. As an analytical tactic, this allows
us to investigate with great effectiveness and detail ex-
actly how actors of a given kind in specific circumstances
decide to reproduce, tinker with, invent, forget, or sup-
press a given substantive proposition. This is an actor-
centered view of agency, which takes intentions and ca-
pabilities for action as its starting point. But what about
the reverse perspective—in which bodies of knowledge
are preexisting and actors are constituted through their
relation to them, in other words, through their public
acts of knowing? A related question concerns which
kinds of “knowledge” are best analyzed using Barth’s
point of view. His examples seem to suggest that this
works, basically, for things that people have choice about
believing or at least may be modeled as having choice
about: which interpretation of an ambiguous precept to
foment, for instance, or whether to write a research grant
to investigate DNA, cold fusion, or extrasensory percep-
tion. It’s not clear where to fit in habituated actions be-
low the threshold of consciousness, inculcated feelings
and attitudes such as shame, and such abstract unques-
tionables as Rappaport’s (1979) “ultimate sacred postu-
lates” or Bourdieu’s (1977) “generative principles.”
Barth’s essay thus should perhaps be read as an extremely
stimulating staking out of a well-delimited part of the
problem of agency and social reproduction.
alan rumsey
Department of Anthropology, Research School of
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Barth says that among the Baktaman
the most abstract and systematically developed tra-
dition of knowledge . . . was cast in the form of se-
cret rituals that dealt with growth, vegetative fertil-
ity, and support from ancestors. . . .
By means of ritual manipulation and juxtaposi-
tion in the rituals, analogies were created between
phenomena, and metaphors were created which
were thus, as symbols, brought into harmony with
each other to enrich each other’s connotations.
Thus, for example, a series of analogies was demon-
strated between different models of growth . . . link-
ing all of them as images of the effects of an invisi-
ble force, somewhat like heat, that makes taro
plants and subterranean corms grow.
One of the main points of his pathbreaking (1975) ac-
count of these traditions (which is consistent with his
present account) is that their object is essentially inef-
fable. The symbols are concrete, mainly visual ones
which in their use among the Baktaman are never sub-
jected to the kind of explicit exegesis through which
Barth himself is able to link them all and to suggest a
common theme such as the “invisible force” described
above. Any attempt to do so is, as I think Barth would
agree, a compromise that renders them more intelligible
from what he calls the “externalist” viewpoint but strips
them of the capacity they give to Baktaman initiates to
“experience what otherwise might be misery or boredom
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. . . as the very epitome of the ‘good life’” (Barth 1975:
236)—and, indeed, of their capacity to inform such
highly efficacious practices as the mulching of taro
mounds.
A somewhat similar compromise is, I suggest, in-
volved in Barth’s present attempt to be as explicit as
possible about what he means by “knowledge.” He is of
course not the first social theorist to take this as a central
term of analysis. One thinks, for example, of Karl Mann-
heim (1936) and the large body of ensuing work done
under the banner of the “sociology of knowledge,” of
Foucault’s (1972) vision of an “archeology of knowl-
edge,” and even of C. S. Peirce, whose foundational work
in semiotics had no place for a notion of structure but
was all about the growth of knowledge. But it is probably
fair to say that no anthropologist has made “knowledge”
as central a working concept as Barth has. The anthro-
pological context is crucial here, for—notwithstanding
his own (1975:159–71) aversion to positional or “con-
trastive” accounts of meaning—the sense that Barth
wants to give to the term “knowledge” is best under-
stood in terms of the explicit contrast he here develops
between it and its presumed “other,” namely, “culture”
(differentially distributed versus diffusely shared, dis-
tinct from reflection and actions, etc.).
But when Barth attempts to define “knowledge” pos-
itively, he vacillates between descriptions which are too
broad to operationalize (“what a person employs to in-
terpret and act on the world . . . [including] feelings (at-
titudes) as well as information, embodied skills as well
as verbal taxonomies and concepts”) and ones which are
too narrow to be adequate, even as descriptions of his
own analytical procedure (“a corpus of substantive as-
sertions”). His proposed threefold disaggregation of
knowledge (substantive corpus, medium and represen-
tations, social organization) has much to recommend it,
as does his processual approach in general, but it is not
clear that “social organization” can be separated out as
the distinctly actional dimension of knowledge, since all
three faces of knowledge are involved “in every trans-
action in knowledge, in every performance,” and since
social organization is partly a matter of sedimented fields
in which actors are “positioned.” Nor is it always clear
how to distinguish knowledge as “substantive corpus”
from “medium and representations,” since knowledge of
the latter is crucial in any society and a substantial part
of what is differentially distributed.
But it would be grossly unfair to hold Barth to the letter
of his own attempted exegesis here of what he means by
“knowledge.” The brilliance of his work has always been
most evident in the use he has been able to make of such
terms as what Karl Popper (1972) would have called
“searchlights” for the illumination of human social life
in a wide variety of ethnographic settings. In this respect
their effect is rather like the ineffable forms of coherence
among disparate experiential realms that are achieved
through the concrete metaphors of Baktaman ritual—an
effect which makes Barth’s general account of knowl-
edge even more “reflexively applicable” than he may
have anticipated.
bob simpson
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In a fitting tribute to the scholarship and intellectual
virtuosity of Sidney Mintz, Barth has produced an en-
gaging and provocative invitation to consider knowledge
as an important theoretical and methodological locus for
ethnographic enquiry. Knowledge is one of those slippery
concepts that, along with, for example, “family,” “or-
ganization,” “tradition,” and “individual,” enable an-
thropologists to talk to one another without getting too
bogged down in the specificities of culture and setting.
By drawing our attention to corpus, media, and social
organization as crucial variables brought together in very
different ways in a range of social, economic, and his-
torical circumstances, Barth has gone some way toward
suggesting a systematic approach to the study of knowl-
edge across radically different contexts. The approach is
one with which I am broadly sympathetic, and I have
found a focus on knowledge as the subject of transaction
and contestation useful in my own analysis of traditional
healers in Sri Lanka (Simpson 1997). However, whilst
the lecture succeeds in setting off numerous conceptual
and analytical rabbits in some interesting and suggestive
directions, there are some important omissions. In par-
ticular I am interested in what has happened to tradition,
creativity, and, above all, performance in this otherwise
stimulating exposition.
I draw attention to these dimensions of knowledge
because I think they would significantly strengthen the
arguments that Barth presents. Leaving universities aside
for the time being, the forms of knowledge that he uses
to make his case are not just any knowledge but ritual
knowledge, and as such their immanence is made tan-
gible through performances made up of audiences, ac-
tion, and various kinds of embodied authority. As Leach
(1976) once suggested, ritual is practical philosophy; even
if it is not necessarily coming up with answers, it is at
least posing intelligible questions about existential ver-
ities such as suffering, life, death, and conflict. Yet, the
power and authority of this knowledge do not simply
come down to assertions of its primordiality; they are
achieved through the repeated performance of persuasive
ritual acts. Medium and message, as Marshall McLuhan
(1964) and others since have argued, are powerfully in-
tertwined in the communication of this kind of knowl-
edge. Thus, practice informed by tradition is always si-
multaneously “old” and “new”; convention and inven-
tion are two sides of the same coin. Convention has to
be continually invented and re-presented, whilst implicit
in the notion of invention are conventions from which
practice deviates. Focus on the activities of those who
are responsible for the performance of things traditional
(healers, priests, elders, shamans) ought to throw light
on the mechanisms and techniques whereby perform-
ance in the present comes to carry the unmistakable
stamp of tradition. In this view, tradition is not a mere
receptacle of invariant knowledge; rather, it is made up
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of fundamentally creative and interpretive acts on the
part of the carriers of tradition which are intended to
make it appear invariant, ancient, and primordial (cf: Bell
1992 and Fuller 1997). Tradition is in effect a history of
creativity (Simpson n.d.), and the exponents of tradition
bear an “existential responsibility” (Pye 1991:30) be-
cause they must adapt to their present circumstances
the knowledge and skills passed on to them. The creative
act is to do this in such a way as to deny change and
temporality and to fabricate for their audiences a sense
of transmitted invariance and timelessness: a perfor-
mative illusion of considerable ingenuity and persuasive
power (cf. Smith 1982:53).
All of this would appear to take us a long way from
modern academic knowledge, but, as Barth demon-
strates, there is much that might be learned from the
ways in which Ok cosmology or Bali-Hindu thought is
socially organized and routinely transacted. Yet, outside
of laboratory studies we have remarkably little by way
of ethnographic research on contemporary academic
practice. Paying attention to the details of that practice
not just in different disciplines but also in different coun-
tries (see Gledhill 2000) seems like a good idea if we are
to comment reflectively on what we do in the name of
responsible teaching and scholarship. Yet again, the per-
formative dimensions of knowledge are underplayed. For
example, the revolution in information and communi-
cation technologies not only has had a massive impact
on the shape of academic knowledge (the corpus) but also
is radically changing its performance and transmission
(analogies with the impact of literacy on oral traditions
would not be out of place here). Teaching that once took
place in a socio-moral context with some parallels to the
performance and transmission of Ok or Bali-Hindu
knowledge now takes place in a radically altered context.
The expansion of information and communication tech-
nologies and the audit, surveillance, and monitoring they
make possible means that knowledge transactions are
increasingly virtual, technological, and information-
based. Democratization of information ushers in new
forms of authority and accountability. Whereas tradi-
tional ritual performers are required to put their energies
into making things that are changing seem the same, the
energy of academics seems currently to be driven to-
wards masking the stability and continuity of their
traditions in order to create a disembodied knowledge
that appears new and innovative at every turn. The pos-
sible implications of this trend are profound, and Barth
is to be congratulated for suggesting some of the frame-
works we might construct in order to make possible a
comparative exercise in the global ethnography of
knowledge.
james f . weiner
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Barth’s definition of knowledge is on the face of it in-
nocuous—it doesn’t matter whether we are talking about
knowledge, practice, culture, or structure, because his
broad view of knowledge encompasses all these features
and, furthermore, he attests to their mutual determi-
native effects on each other. These terms are the ones
with which we narrow down and make visible the sub-
ject of our inquiry for specific analytic purposes. We
make the terms appear to have certain distinct features,
and in this regard they are as useful as the ends to which
we put them. What analytic ends are met by Barth’s own
glosses on this nexus of human behaviour and concep-
tualization?
Despite avowing the mutual interconnection of the
three “faces” of knowledge—corpus, mode of transmis-
sion and representation, and social organization—Barth
argues that “the knowledge component of our being is
conceptually separable from our relationships . . . the
social dimensions of our lives.” While this seems intu-
itively acceptable to us as Westerners, it is also the case
that along with what we learn as a corpus of propositions
we also absorb the techniques of nescience that confi-
gure the limits of that corpus and its vehicles of repre-
sentation. But what we do not, cannot, or are not sup-
posed to know for whatever social reason is not as easy
to represent to ourselves as the explicit portions which
embody what is overtly bequeathed to us in the social
world.
Because Barth separates the corpus of propositions
from their mode of transmission, he creates the problem
of what is or is not transmitted under certain condi-
tions—the examples he uses come from his non-Western
field areas of Western Province, Papua New Guinea, and
Bali. In response to the dilemma of the Baktaman ritual
adept, who must reproduce ancestral secret knowledge
despite the long duration of its nonperformance and non-
transmission, I pose the dilemmas of contemporary in-
digenous Australians living in settled Australia, who face
the challenge of recovering their precolonial traditions
after a long period of dispossession and forced forgetting
of them in order to reclaim native title rights to their
ancestral lands. The Australian states and federal gov-
ernment have been inclined to accept that these
traditions have been “washed away by the tide of his-
tory” (as one federal court judge opined in a recent land-
mark native title case) and that consequently contem-
porary Aborigines have “lost their tradition.”
From one point of view, the comparison between the
Baktaman and Aborigines in settled Australia is only
structural. After all, the perception of loss among the
Baktaman is an endogenously engendered one, while
many indigenous Australians were forced through vari-
ous oppressive actions by settler society to relinquish
their language, religion, myth, and so forth. But, as, I was
told by an Aboriginal Australian whose native title claim
I have been researching, any given generation knows ex-
actly what it knows at any given time. If indigenous
knowledge of country became mediated through Abo-
riginal employment on white-owned pastoral stations in
the late 19th and 20th centuries, it is indigenous knowl-
edge of country nevertheless. Its continuity with a pre-
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vious regime of knowledge of country in a landscape
devoid of settlers is nevertheless patent.
While Barth does an excellent job preserving the pro-
portions of the dilemma of “how much we should know”
between the very differently scaled worlds of the Bak-
taman and the Balinese, I am less sure how his third
example, that of academic knowledge, relates to the first
two cases. From my Australian perspective, at least Brit-
ish universities are focusing on research output that ac-
ademics would find acceptable, and the priority seems
to be preserving the ability of academic departments to
sustain themselves in the terms he evidently favours. In
Australia, however, research output barely ranks against
postgraduate student degrees awarded. To my mind this
means that a wedge has been driven into the nexus of
academic research and scholarly transmission of a dis-
ciplinary methodology through postgraduate supervi-
sion; it is no longer necessary to demonstrate scholarship
to supervise its reproduction in Australian universi-
ties—here, then, is the real danger of separating knowl-
edge from its hierarchies of transmission. Further, re-
sources are being diverted away from the Ph.D. program
as such to shorter postgraduate degrees that will attract
full-fee-paying students. The result can be pre-
dicted—the current emphasis is on producing postgrad-
uates not with purely academic qualifications but with
more tailored degrees in “applied” disciplinary knowl-
edge and practice, designed to facilitate their employ-
ment outside of the university sector. While I am in no
doubt of the value of such courses, given that more an-
thropologists in Australia are currently employed out-
side the universities than within them, I am not sure
how long it will take, left unchecked, for this mode of
transmission to remove altogether the need for scholarly
reproduction of disciplinary knowledge. The ultimate ef-
fect of this practice by Austrialian academic depart-
ments, particularly anthropology departments, may
come to resemble the response of indigenous Australians
in the early 20th century: Faced with exile and incar-
ceration if they were caught speaking their own language
or practising their precolonial customs, they ceased to
do so, leaving subsequent indigenous generations the ar-
duous task of creating the conditions for its reappearance
and reembodiment. There may come a time when Aus-
tralian antropologists will face the laborious task of reas-
serting the continuity between academic anthropology
and that which seems to be replacing it. But, to repeat
the words of my indigenous interlocutor, every genera-
tion knows what it must know—and can know.
Reply
fredrik barth
Boston, Mass., U.S.A. 9 x 01
I very much welcome the remarks of my respondents,
each of which is constructive and challenging. By pre-
senting not obstacles but productive questions they
show the productivity of an anthropological focus on
knowledge.
Chiu points to the important ways in which the com-
munication of a thought shapes that thought through a
subtle interaction of the need to cast it in a form appro-
priate to the medium in which it is being encoded, the
operations that can be performed in that code, the con-
straints of convention, audience design, etc. This shapes
the thought as a vector in subsequent cognition and use
and in the production of shared meanings. Though Chiu
seems to favour language over other forms of codifica-
tion, this schema appears equally relevant to all the me-
dia of communication that must engage the ethnogra-
pher. Indeed, the recent work by Whitehouse (2000) takes
some steps in this very direction. We should welcome
the promise that Chiu’s invitation to interdisciplinary
discussion offers.
Rumsey helpfully explicates the problems I face in my
attempts to identify the ineffable objects of Baktaman
knowledge in an externalist and English-language mode.
He further points to difficulties inherent in my concept
of knowledge. I might say that I intended less than to
“define” knowledge positively (“what a person employs
to interpret and act on the world . . . etc.”). It is enough
for us to recognize that it is where persons engage in
such tasks that we should look for empirical manifes-
tations of knowledge. The idea of a corpus, however,
refers to only one of the three elemental faces of knowl-
edge and not its totality, though it is meant to embrace
all forms of templates and skills, non-linguistic as much
as linguistic. Rumsey’s other query regarding my char-
acterization of “social organization” as another face of
knowledge is very well taken. I hoped to identify a social
domain embracing all the interactional affordances and
constraints on performance at the moment of action. But
since all interaction arises from a prepositioning of the
interacting parties and since we need to retrieve all the
relevant institutional statuses, conventions, and capac-
ities under this heading, that is not adequate. Too many
substantive aspects of social knowledge and too many
predistributed skills of communication seem to be folded
into this face at present. I have not been able to find a
form of words that serves my intentions better and tags
what I wish to disaggregate; perhaps the problem is that
my construction attempts to schematize too much. At
the same time, I do not wish to lose its marginalist po-
tential, which depends on modeling a minimal set of
factors that impinge on actors at the moment when
knowledge is made manifest in action.
This is where I accommodate the focus on perform-
ance that Simpson misses. His observation that my main
illustrations are limited to ritual is important. It is es-
sential that we be able to analyse knowledge of different
domains and different ways of knowing. Though I could
not pursue it in the narrow compass of an article, I claim
that it can be done. The result would be to demonstrate
how diverse the different traditions of knowledge indeed
are. It would also compel me to give a different account
of the central problem of so much of philosophy and
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methodology, namely, how nature impinges on some
forms of knowledge in a much more determinate way
than it does in those forms that I discuss here.
Robb points up my partiality to the actor side of the
actor/structure antinomy. What about the reverse per-
spective, he asks, in which bodies of knowledge are pre-
existing and actors are constituted through their relation
to them? I acknowledge that in resisting the structur-
alists’ single-minded emphasis on the aggregate I tend
polemically to stress the agency of individuals so as to
escape the stasis of the preexisting. That is why Russell’s
framing of the problem of knowledge was so attractive
to me. A more disengaged way is to conceptualize the
two as parts of a dialectic. Yet the point of my exercise
is to identify the processes that generate these vast bod-
ies of accumulated public knowledge. Wallerstein (1988:
531) speaks of culture as the residue of pastness but chal-
lenges the usefulness of that view by the counter that
“we only know pastness in the present.” My strategy is
precisely to capture that present knowledge in its dis-
tributed modality, to see the traditions of knowledge in
their moment of manifestation as they are deployed and
identify the reproductive consequences and marginal
changes which that deployment produces. In this view,
the only “other” kind of knowledge, located elsewhere,
would be in textbooks, archives, data banks, and the
minds of others—but it needs to be retrieved in the pre-
sent to have consequences. Through the lense of the mo-
ment of action, could we not capture the whole? So,
commenting on Robb’s illustrations, I would say that
“shame” may be a socially inculcated habit and exist
below the threshold of consciousness, but it is present
when it affects the design and interpretation of my ac-
tions and irrelevant unless it does. Robb’s other illus-
trations—Rappaport’s ultimate sacred postulates and
Bourdieu’s generative principles—I would regard as our
abstract constructions rather than as anyone else’s
knowledge. But we must also be prepared sometimes to
entertain simultaneous disjunctive perspectives on our
object and be willing to speak, for example, of a dialectic
whenever that might prove useful.
I happily join Weiner and his Australian informant in
claiming knowledge transmitted among Aboriginal
workmen on cattle stations as indigenous knowledge.
Certain chains of transmission can be tragically weak-
ened and disrupted and produce deeply mutated knowl-
edge yet be linked to perduring social groups and iden-
tities, and every incident of transmission, whether
successfully replicating or tenuously transforming, de-
pends equally on a creative performance at the moment
of communication.
Weiner’s despair over how to reproduce a tradition of
scholarship in the modern Australian university will res-
onate, I fear, with many of us. One way to resist the
administrators’ abuse of the university is to show them
that the model they use for our case is entirely inappro-
priate. Even if our only function were to produce grad-
uates for employers outside the academic sector, the con-
ditions under which we do so are unique in that the
university sector must be capable of reproducing itself
or it disappears. Unlike all other modern institutions,
we have no other place to turn for skilled recruits in the
hundreds of different disciplines: unless the university
sector is allowed to produce full-fledged scholars, it will
not be there to serve any of its other functions in 20
years’ time.
I have saved Rodseth’s comments till last, since they
allow me also to articulate my homage to Sidney Mintz.
Rodseth generously places my work in an emerging neo-
Boasian tradition and points to the fruitfulness of the
generative mechanisms I analyse for tasks of historical
and regional synthesis, as much as for the analysis of
endogenous transformations. I would be very satisfied if
the perspective we discuss here were recognized as one
that allows us to resume some of Boas’s large and central
tasks for anthropology—ambitions that have been side-
lined in much contemporary work. He laid claim to an
immensely ambitious scholarly space for anthropology.
His broadest intent was to develop a discipline that could
address the dynamics of human society and culture with
empirical rigour but generalizing intent, through histor-
ical syntheses as much as close analysis of mechanisms.
This is a vision and a practice that we should all in our
various ways be more prepared to shoulder and that Sid-
ney Mintz has honoured in his scholarship.
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